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Globalization of Constitutional Law
and Civil Rights
David Weissbrodt
The teaching of U.S. constitutional law is remarkably insular. A quick
review of course books reveals few, if any, references to materials from other
countries or to relevant international law.1 Constitutional law courses focus
almost exclusively on the U.S. constitutional order. The course books appear
to consider as unique this country's balance of power between the national
government and the states and its approach to bridging the structural tension
among executive, legislative, and judicial branches. One colleague facetiously
told me that the only country comparable to the United States is the United
Kingdom. Since the U.K. has no written constitution, the U.S. is unique and
no other country is worthy of attention.
In the face of such an insular view, I must say that this article has very
limited objectives. I do not expect that constitutional law professors will
immediately be persuaded to rewrite their course books and revise their
classes. Instead, I can hope only to inspire several teachers to experiment with

David Weissbrodt is Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This article
expands a presentation given at the Association of American Law Schools Mini-Workshop on
Teaching the First Generation of Global Lawyers, held in San Francisco onJanuary 6,1993. The
author thanks Dan Farber and Phil Frickey for their especially helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this presentation, and acknowledges Bill Cohen's thoughtful comments at the workshop. He
also thanks Peter-Christian Olivo and Deborah Ellingboe for valuable assistance in preparing this
article.
1.

See, e.g., Edward L. Barrett, Jr., et al., Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 8th ed.
(Westbury, N.Y., 1991); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law, 12th ed. (Westbury, N.Y.,
1991); William B. Lockhart et al., Constitutional Law, 7th ed. (St. Paul, 1991);John E. Nowak
& Ronald D. Rotunda, Modem Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (St. Paul, 1993); Geoffrey R.
Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Boston, 1991). But see Hurst Hannum, Materials on
International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law (Washington, 1985) (providing
international human rights material for use in constitutional law courses); Mauro Cappelletti
& William Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law (Indianapolis, 1979). For a discussion of
the global impact on the entire law school curriculum, see Michael P. Waxman, The
Comparative Legal Process Throughout the Law School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for
Culture and Competence in a Pluralistic Society, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 391 (1991). As to the need
for an examination of the relationship between international human rights and the U.S.
version, see Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, ch. 10 (Mineola, N.Y., 1972);
Louis Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 593
(1978); Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 Am.J. Int'l
L. 851 (1989); Frank C. Newman, The U.S. Bill of Rights, International Bill of Human Rights,
and Other "Bills," 40 Emory LJ. 731 (1991).
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the use of international human rights law and comparative constitutional law
materials.'
There are some scholars, the originalists, who appear to reject any legal
development that cannot claim its provenance in the text of the Constitution.'
As far as they are concerned, arguments about the evolving meaning of such
basic principles as due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and freedom
of speech may fall upon deaf ears. If originalism is combined with a textualist
fixation upon the words of the document aid a refusal to consider the context
or legislative history of those words, the result may be a mind completely
closed to the usefulness of global influences or sources.
I do not want to rehearse the originalist versus nonoriginalist debate.4 My
remarks are addressed to teachers who believe that the Constitution is a living
document which draws its meaning both from its historical roots and from the
needs of contemporary society. I have a sufficient challenge in arguing that
international human rights law, on the one hand, and comparative constitutional materials, on the other, are worthy of inclusion in a course in U.S.
constitutional law.
This article addresses two issues. First, it discusses the reasons for raising
global and international human rights issues in U.S. courses, including constitutional law and civil rights. Second, it focuses on several barriers to globalization
and suggests ways to overcome these barriers.
Why Consider Global Sources in Constitutional Law?
Whether one should introduce global sources in a thoroughgoing way or
through isolated examples is a question ultimately left to the individual
constitutional law professor's experimentation and decision. Regardless of
the degree of integration one chooses, several issues of U.S. constitutional law
could benefit from a comparative and internationalist viewpoint.
At most law schools and in most of the principal course books, students of
constitutional law face issues of federalism, separation of powers, individual
rights and freedoms, equal protection, state actionjudicial review, and limits
on constitutional litigation. The United States is, of course, not the only

2.

I advocate that constitutional law teachers consider both comparative constitutional materials and international law. Those two domains, of course, arise from different sources.
Law schools are making more of an effort to introduce comparative constitutional law
courses into the curriculum, and some scholars have written extensively on the subject. See,
e.g., Hannum, supra note 1; Cappelletti & Cohen, supra note 1. The basic problem, however,
is thatvery few students enroll in such courses because they were not introduced to comparative law aspects in their first-year constitutional law course. Also, more students can be
reached through the first-year curriculum.

3.

See, e.g., The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law and Public Policy: The
Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence: Originalist Theories of
Constitutional Interpretation, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 350, 355, 364 (1988) (contributions by
Raoul Berger, Robert Bennett, and Michael Moore); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).

4.

Compare sources cited supra note 3 with Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution? 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); see also Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of
Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Review, 77 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1991).
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country which has had to wrestle with those issues. Students can learn to
appreciate or criticize the U.S. approach by comparing it to the way other
nations have solved the same problems.
Here are three examples. One: many countries have specifically addressed
the abortion issue-that divisive constitutional and moral question-through
their judiciary.5 Two: the U.S. approach to judicial review has been criticized
as a countermajoritarian aberration in an otherwise democratic system; 6 that
critique might be answered by a comparative review of other democratic
systems, which seem generally to consider judicial review a necessity. Three:
consider a comparative analysis of the separation of powers. France, for
example, adheres to a clear separation between governmental branches,7
while in the United States some intrusions by one branch into another's
domain are permissible.' Advocating a comparative look at these issues does
not necessarily mean the U.S. method is the least favorable; such comparisons
simply provide legal scholars with another tool to analyze the various issues
presented.
Global comparisons are particularly apt right now because other nations
have been rewriting their constitutions and copying various elements of the
U.S. Constitution. Indeed, there is growing international interest in the U.S.
approach to federalism as a way of dealing with ethnic strife.9 If nations adopt
federal structures or apply such phrases as "due process" and "equal protection," we might in turn learn from their experiences. 0 For example, in
5.

See Cappelletti & Cohen, supra note 1, ch. 12 (comparing constitutional decisions on
abortion from Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States).
6. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 2d ed., 16-23 (New Haven, 1986). But cf.
Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 Yale L.J. 2277,
2283 (1991) (debunking notion that domestic application of international law raises
countermajoritarian problems).
7. For a look at the French philosophical view of separation of powers, see Montesquieu, The
Spirit of Laws, bk. XI.
8. To illustrate how much intrusion by one branch into another is permissible, compare INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), with Mistrettav. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). In Chadha,
the Court held that Congress's retention of veto power over deportation decisions of the
executive branch violated the presentment and bicameralism requirements of the Constitution and, hence, the principle of separation of powers. In Mistretta, the Court held that
Congress's formation of the United States Sentencing Commission within the judicial branchrequiring at least three federal judges to be members-was not a delegation of excessive
legislative power or a violation of the separation of powers principle.
9. See, e.g., Nigeria Const. ch. 1, pt. II (adopting federalist system). There may also be a
comparison to be drawn between the law which has developed in regard to the relationship
between the states and the federal government under the U.S. Constitution and the relationship between the United Nations and national governments under Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter.
10. See, e.g., Phil. Const., art. IV (Bill of Rights) ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of the law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.").
Not only are comparisons appropriate when other countries adopt provisions similar to
those found in the U.S. Constitution, but such comparative analysis is also relevant when
interpreting those same constitutional provisions as applied in domestic law. E.g., compare
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that judiciary has
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teaching comparative constitutional law during 1992-93 at Minnesota, Professor Harry Groves focused on "affirmative action," and how that concept has
been used and misused in India and Malaysia, to shed light on the U.S.
debate."
The case for globalization of the constitutional law curriculum is particularly strong in courses that focus on civil rights and civil liberties. Indeed,
international human rights law and the existence of human rights protections
in constitutions around the world may be used to support the "natural law"
view that rights do not derive only from positive law, but have some more
enduring source.
I argued in the human rights course book I coauthored with Frank Newman
in 1990 that lawyers might be viewed as not capable of serving their clients
ethically in civil rights or civil liberties matters unless they are aware that (1)
there may be international institutions to petition after losing in national
forums, and (2) there are international law arguments they can raise in U.S.
courts. 2 While that comment was intended to be provocative rather than
prescriptive, there are more reasons to support the statement today than there
were even in 1990.

no power to grant state and local governments immunity from otherwise valid federal
commerce clause legislation, effectively giving the federal government unrestrained power
over states under the commerce clause), with Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
2d ed., 439 (Toronto, 1985) (noting that general language of Canadian commerce clause
contrasts with more restrictive text of U.S. commerce clause, yet in practice the Canadian
clause has "turned out to be a much more limited power than its American cousin")
(footnote omitted).
One can also compare the concepts of federalism in various countries. For example, the
application of the death penaltyvaries widely among states, from total abolition to consistent
application. This diversity is generally recognized as a permissible exercise of state police
power in drafting and enforcing criminal laws, so long as the law does not run afoul of the
U.S. Constitution. By contrast, the European Court of Justice has on several occasions
considered whether specific European Community measures are consistent with the basic
principles of human rights incorporated within Community law and has been very tough on
countries whose policies are inconsistent with that law. See Frank Newman & David Weissbrodt,
International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process 438 (Cincinnati, 1990).
11. In India, affirmative action programs have contributed to that country's deteriorating ethnic
situation. Although such programs are designed to acknowledge the equal status of Muslims
in a predominantly Hindu state, in reality the Muslims still suffer from lower economic and
social status. Midnight Draws Near for India, Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 12, 1992, at A8; see also
Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (Oxford,
1984), for an analysis of the costs and benefits of India's compensatory discrimination
policies.
In Malaysia, however, there has been an affirmative action program that favors the majority
over minorities; it has been accompanied by various episodes of repression against minority
groups. See Committee Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia, Tangled Web: Dissent,
Deterrence, and the 27th October 1987 Crackdown 1-4 (Haymarket, NSW, Austi., 1988).
For a useful cautionary about such comparative endeavors, see Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How
Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care? 78 Cal. L. Rev. 539 (1990).
12. Newman & Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at xv.
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In September 1992, the United States joined 114 other nations as a party to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3 In the same month,
the U.S. became bound by the Convention Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labor. 14 These two human rights treaties contain several standards
that are better or at least clearer than U.S. constitutional law. 5 For example,
the Civil and Political Covenant explicitly forbids sex discrimination, while the
U.S. Constitution lacks such a prohibition except as to voting. The Covenant'
ensures "equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage." 6 It
expressly protects the right to privacy and family, 7 and protects liberty of
movement. 8 There are many other examples in which the Covenant might be
cited as influential in interpreting vague protections of the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. scholars and litigants should be aware not only of the language of
these treaties, but also of the substantial corpus ofjurisprudence that is being
amassed by such bodies as the Human Rights Committee under the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. As the Human Rights Committee issues its
General Comments on the treaty provisions and as it expresses views on
governmental reports and on the individual cases brought to test treaty
violations, the mass of human rights law applicable to the U.S. grows.
Another reason for devoting greater attention to international human
rights law is the growing international critique of the U.S. human rights
performance. That critique should eventually erode the misconception in this
country that the U.S. is nearly always more protective of human rights than
other nations. For example, with more than 2,500 prisoners on death row in
this country, there is widening international criticism of the U.S. application
of the death penalty. In the Soering Case,19 the European Court of Human
Rights refused to allow extradition of a German national because he faced a
long wait on death row in Virginia before being subject to execution for
13. GA. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976, entered intoforce for the U.S. Sept. 8,
1992 [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant]. The Covenant
establishes an international minimum standard of conduct for all participating
governments, ensuring the rights of self-determination; legal redress; equality;
life; liberty; freedom of movement; fair, public, and speedy trial of criminal
charges; privacy; freedom of expression, thought, conscience, and religion;
peaceful assembly; freedom of association (including trade union rights);
family; and participation in public affairs; but forbidding torture; "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"; slavery; arbitrary arrest;
-1double jeopardy; and imprisonment for debt.
David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn. L.
Rev. 35, 37-38 (1978) (footnotes omitted); see David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings
and Declarations, 14 Hum. Rts. LJ. 77 (1993).
14. Convention Concerning theAbolition of Forced Labor (I.L.O. No.105), enteredintoforce Jan.
17, 1959, 320 U.N.T.S. 291, entered intoforcefor the U.S. Sept. 25, 1992.
15. See Letter from Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Marvin Frankel,
Chairman, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (Mar. 5, 1992) (on file with author).
16. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 13, art. 23.
17. Id. art. 17.
18. Id. art. 12.
19. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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murder. Similarly, Canada refused to extradite until the U.S. promised not
to subject the defendant to risk of the death penalty, ° and the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights has found the U.S. in violation of
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man in executing
2
juvenile offenders. 1
Another example of international criticism can be found in the July 1992
decision of a working group of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that the U.S. had committed a
gross and consistent pattern of human rights violations both in police beatings
in Los Angeles and in the failure to provide remedies for the beatings.2 2 By the
closest vote of 11-10, the Sub-Commission decided not to pursue the case, but
that dispute gives an inkling of the growing international criticism of U.S.
23
human rights performance.
There appears to be a new recognition in this country of the need to listen
to more diverse voices when attempting to understand domestic law-namely,
the voices of women and nonwhite U.S. residents. The remainder of the world
is largely nonwhite and we should, at the very least, be aware of these other
views. Barriers to Globalization and How They Might Be Overcome
Several major barriers stand in the way of globalization of the constitutional
law and civil rights curriculum. Some stem from pedagogical problems, while
others derive from the reluctance of U.S. courts to apply international law
principles. All of these barriers can be overcome-and must be if we are to
train our students to become responsive to an increasingly globalized society.
PedagogicalBarriers
One serious problem arises from the breadth of the subject and the
quantity of material. A skeptic might inquire: How can one argue for inserting
comparative materials into standard course books when there is not enough
time or room for much that is directly relevant to the U.S. Constitution?
In addition, most constitutional law books make no serious effort to inform
the reader of the substantive law relevant to many topics. For example, the

20. Canada refused to extradite Lee O'Bomsawin, a Canadian national, to Florida to stand trial
for double murder. SeeJohn F. Bums, Canada Wins U.S. Extradition Deal, N.Y Times, Feb.
14, 1992, at A3. But see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R1 779, and Reference re Ng
Extradition v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Canadian Supreme Court refusing to resist
extradition solely on potential of death penalty in United States).
21. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987); see David
Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International
Human Rights Law, 3 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 339 (1988).
22. See Petition for United Nations Assistance Under Resolution 1503, letter from Diana G.
Collier, Director, Communications, International Human Rights Association of American
Minorities, to Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Apr. 30,
1992) (on file with author).
23. See Adrien-Claude Zoller, Analytical Report on the 44th Session of the Sub-Commission, 1718 Hum. Rts. Monitor (Int'i Service for Hum. Rts.) 6, 18 (1992).
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student may learn about the three Civil War amendments, the constitutional
underpinnings of the civil fights statutes, as well as problems of state action.
But most constitutional law courses do not attempt to keep abreast of the
myriad of state and local ordinances that go far beyond the federal strictures
in forbidding discrimination by individuals, in identifying kinds of discrimination unprotected by federal civil rights laws, or in regulating places in which
discrimination may occur. In this context, how can one argue for the inclusion
of international law which may provide less compelling authority than an
applicable state statute or local ordinance?
My principal answer is twofold. First, with the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Labor
Organization's Forced Labor Convention, 4 and the Protocol Relating to the
26
Status of Refugees,u and with other multilateral instruments in the pipeline,
those treaties will have an impact upon constitutional law and will begin to be
cited more frequently by litigants and judges. To the extent that the treaties
and the relevant jurisprudence are superior to U.S. law, course books should
make reference to international human rights law. Second, U.S. doctrinal
developments on some constitutional law topics have not been satisfactorily
resolved; international approaches-for example, to freedom of religion2
might be helpful, if only by providing a checklist of relevant issuesY.
Barriersto UsingInternationalHuman Rights Law in US. Courts
The Bush Administration and the Senate attempted to erect a second
barrier to the use of international human rights treaties by attaching several
reservations, declarations, and understandings limiting the use of the Civil
and Political Covenant in U.S. courts. One declaration makes the Covenant
not self-executing in the absence of implementing legislation. Others restrict

24. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, supranote 14 (112 states parties).
25. Protocol Relating to th-e Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, enteredintoforce
Oct. 4, 1967, entered intoforcefor the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968 (116 states parties).
26. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination,
660 U.N.T.S. 195,5 I.L.M. 352, entered intoforceJan.4, 1969 (134 states parties).
27. Reference might be made, for example, to Article 18 of the Civil and Political Covenant,
supra note 13, and the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, GA. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/,36/51 (1981). It is worthy of note that the Senate did not
attach any reservations to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion provision in
Article 18 of the Covenant. Another example might be found in R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 112
S.Ct. 2538 (1992), in which the Supreme Court relied exclusively on the FirstAmendment in
rejecting the application of a municipal ordinance, which penalized racial hate speech, to a
cross-burning case. Professor Akhil Reed Amar has criticized the Court's analysis for its
failure to consider the impact of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See The Case
of the Missing Amendments: RA.V. v. City of St. Pau4 106 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 125, 151-60
(1992). Along the same line, if the Court had focused at all on international human rights
law, it would at least have had to consider the balance between freedom of expression and
incitements to racial hatred. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 13, art. 20 ("Any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility of violence shall be prohibited by law."). For further exploration of the use of
international human rights law in domestic courts, see, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, International
Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy and Practice, 2d ed., 86-163 (Boston, 1991).
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the reach of particular clauses; for example, the United States considers itself
bound by the Covenant's very broad prohibition of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" only to the extent that the clause is congruent with the far narrower prohibition in the Eighth Amendment against "cruel
2
and unusual punishment.."
But these limitations should not stop U.S. lawyers and scholars from citing
more protective international principles when they work with the vague
clauses of the U.S. Constitution-not as binding law, but as useful guidance. It
is for the courts and not the Senate to decide whether a multilateral treaty
provision is self-executing, that is, enforceable without further legislation.2
Indeed, some of the reservations to the Covenant may be so inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the treaty that they could be found invalid. 30 Finally,
the U.S. was not permitted by the International Labor Organization to attach
a similar limitation to its ratification of the Forced Labor Convention. 3' The
limitations do not represent an insurmountable barrier.
Convincing U.S. judges, administrative officials, and scholars that they
should pay any attention to international law is, of course, very difficult. The
Supreme Court'sJune 1992 decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machai 3 2 makes
this clear. In that case, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents arranged for the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor suspected of assisting in the
murder of a DEA agent, in Mexico, and forcibly brought him to the U.S. to
stand trial. Lower courts held that the kidnapping violated the extradition
treaty between the U.S. and Mexico, but the Supreme Court failed this

28. For a transcript of the U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings to the Civil and
Political Covenant, see 138 Cong. Rec. S4783-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992); 31 I.L.M. 645-61
(1992).
29. See Weissbrodt, supranote 13, at 68-69; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United
States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent.
L. Rev. 515, 526 (1991); cf. Anne Bayefsky &Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights
Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 Mich.J. Int'l L. 1, 42-47 (1992).
30. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ. 15; see also Belilos Case, 132 Eur. Ci H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (holding Swiss
declarations to Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
invalid as reservations inconsistent with Convention); Henry Bourguignon, The Belilos Case:
New Light on Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 29 Va.J. Int'l L. 347 (1989).
31. See Instrument of Ratification,June 7, 1991 (received by the ILO on Sept. 25, 1991); Letter
of Michel Hansenne, International Labor Organization, to U.S. Ambassador Morris Abram
(Sept. 25, 1991) (on file with author).
32. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). Perhaps the most glaring example of the Supreme Court's refusal to
look to international law is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In rejecting the equal
protection claims of a homosexual convicted under Georgia's sodomy statute, ChiefJustice
Burger noted in his concurring opinion that proscriptions against sodomy have very ancient
roots and after tracing this history commented, 'To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy
is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching." Id. at 197. Curiously enough, no mention was made of a 1981 decision by the
European Court of Human Rights, which held, in a virtually identical case, that the private
life of adult male homosexuals is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention.
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1992); see also Newman &Weissbrodt,
supranote 10, at 680.
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important test of its respect for international law.33 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority and finding nothing in the extradition treaty that
explicitly forbids kidnapping, approved the abduction even though, the Court
admitted, it "may be in violation of general international law principles."' 4
The Supreme Court also ignored international law principles in its 1989
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky.3 5 In that case, the Court held that the execution ofjuvenile offenders did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. In delivering the majority opinion, Justice
Scalia rejected claims that such actions violate international practices, stating
that "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, [not] the
sentencing practices of other countries." 6
These Supreme Court decisions should not dissuade U.S. lawyers from
turning to international law principles. In other instances, U.S. courts have
used international practices to guide their constitutional interpretation. The
Stanford dissent, for example, noted several previous Supreme Court cases,
going back to Trop v. Dulles,5 7 in which the Court had found "objective
indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in
other countries [to be relevant] to Eighth Amendment analysis."'
One need only look to the history of Brown v. Board of Education9 to be
convinced that the international perspective is vital to the development of
U.S. substantive law. Brown revealed the desire of the U.S. and the Supreme
Court to avoid appearing uncivilized or unprotective of human rights. In the
early 1950s the impact of racial segregation on African diplomats in the U.S.
was becoming too embarrassing. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown was
at least partially motivated by concerns about the international image of the
U.S.40 Similar forces are at work today in areas where the U.S. human rights
performance is the subject of criticism.

33. For critical analyses of Alvarez-Machain, see Keith Highet & George Kahale III, International
Decisions (United States v. Alvarez-Machain), 86Am.J. Int'l L. 811 (1992); MichaelJ. Glennon,
State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 Am.J. Int'l L.
746 (1992); see also Louis Henkin, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Flunk International Law?
Am. Soc. Int'l L. Newsl., Aug./Sept. 1992, at 1. But cf. Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the
Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86Am.J. Int'l L. 736 (1992).
34. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
35. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
36. Id. at 369 n.1.
37. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
38. Stanford,492 U.S. at 389 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61, 111
(1988); Mark Tushnet with Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1908 (1991).

270

Journalof Legal Education

I have suggested some important reasons for globalizing the law school
curriculum in constitutional law, civil rights, administrative law, and other
subjects. Realistically, I do not expect that all constitutional law professors
will undertake this experimental work, but I do hope that several will be
interested.

